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Juvenile Death Sentence Lives on… 
Even after Roper v. Simmons 
 
AKIN ADEPOJU* 
 
A crime prevention policy which accepts 
keeping a prisoner for life even if he is no 
longer a danger to society would be 
compatible neither with modern principles 
on the treatment of prisoners during the 
execution of their sentence nor with the idea 
of the reintegration of offenders into 
society.
1
 
 
 
very year, children as young as thirteen years old are 
sentenced to die in prison in the United States. This 
sentencing practice continues even after the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, which held that the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the death penalty 
for juvenile offenders.2 This sentencing practice and national 
trend is called juvenile life without parole [hereinafter 
“LWOP”].  The elements which support the holding in Roper 
v. Simmons are that juveniles have unformed characters, are 
                                                 
* Akin Adepoju, cum laude graduate of Roger Williams University 
School of Law, University of Maryland, College Park, and former 
Marshal to His Honour Judge Paul Tain, Woolwich Crown Court, 
London, England. A 2007 - 2009 Fellow at the Fair Trial Initiative, an 
organization that litigates death penalty cases. Special thanks to Professor 
Larry J. Ritchie for his indispensable comments and under whom this 
article was originally written. As well, I extend my gratitude to my 
brother, Barrister Akinola Adepoju, whose critical eye helped suggest 
ways to improve this article, and HHJ Paul Tain, whose discussion on 
English and European Law helped during my research.   
1 Marc Mauer, Ryan S. King, and Malcolm C. Young, The Meaning 
of ‘Life’: Long Prison Sentences in Context, (The Sentencing Project, 
2004), p. 1, www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/lifers.pdf (last visited March 
29, 2007). 
2 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (5-4 decision) 
(banning death sentences for crimes committed by juveniles under the age 
of eighteen). 
E
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immature, and are more susceptible to peer pressure than 
adults. 3 This decision leads to the following question: If 
juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults, is it 
appropriate to sentence juveniles to life without parole? A 
2005 report by Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch states that only four countries impose life without 
parole on juveniles: United States (2,225,350 of these inmates 
were 15 or younger when they committed the crime), Israel 
(7); South Africa (4); and Tanzania (1).4 
This article begins with a discussion of the Supreme 
Court’s decision to abolish the death penalty as applied to 
individuals convicted of crimes they committed before they 
turned 18 and proceeds with a detailed exposition of 
worldwide standards of juvenile sentencing. Part I of this note 
briefly discusses the history and purposes of the juvenile 
justice system in the United States. Further, there is a general 
discussion on the constitutionality of life without parole 
sentences, which provides an overview of the inconsistencies 
between Federal and State Courts’ approaches when 
sentencing juveniles to life without parole.  
Part II analyzes the international law on the rights of 
juveniles by using several landmark documents and treaties, 
such as the Convention on the Rights of Children. This leads 
to a survey of juvenile justice systems around the world, 
including case law and reform instituted as a result of the 
international conventions explicitly banning juvenile LWOP 
sentences. This discussion recognizes the importance of the 
world’s view on the issue of juvenile LWOP and how such 
human rights principles should serve as persuasive authority 
                                                 
3 Id. at 570. 
4 Alison Parker, The Rest of Their Lives: Life without Parole for 
Child Offenders in the United States (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter “HRW 
Report”],100-01. 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR511622005, (last visited 
Dec 24, 2006) (This report is the first national analysis of juvenile LWOP 
sentences. The 2,225 people serving LWOP sentences for crimes they 
committed as juveniles do not include juvenile LWOP sentences in Idaho, 
Kentucky, Maine or West Virginia—these data were not included in the 
survey. See HRW Report, Appendix D: State Population Data Table at 
123-24).  
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to America. Part II concludes by using a step-by-step 
approach to analyze and explain how juvenile LWOP 
sentences in America violate customary international law. 
Part III asserts and explains why juvenile LWOP 
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment. This section includes a 
detailed analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper 
and addresses the Court’s recognition of international 
standards on human rights issues. 
Part IV reviews the policy behind punishment, society’s 
interest in punishment, and how that relates to juveniles. The 
analysis of the Roper decision and some common sense ideas 
lead to the conclusion that juvenile LWOP sentences are 
excessive and ineffective deterrent for juveniles. Further, this 
note takes a detailed approach examining and concluding that 
such sentences violate the principle of rehabilitation, impose 
excessive retribution, and violate constitutional principles 
prohibiting excessive punishment. 
Part V advocates the position that reform is necessary to 
the juvenile justice system insofar as juvenile LWOP 
sentences must be abolished. It proposes ideas as to how this 
reform may come about—mostly through the judicial and 
legislative branch. Simply leaving the reform up to the state 
or national legislature is not acceptable because state and 
federal judges are authorized and compelled to act in a 
manner consistent with human rights standard. 
The article concludes by recognizing that the Supreme 
Court must eventually resolve the inconsistency among the 
state courts and this resolution must take into consideration 
the unique nature of the global concurrence on the matter as 
the Court did in Roper. The Court is likely to hold that 
juvenile LWOP is unconstitutional because it is cruel and 
unusual punishment and it violates treaty obligations and/or 
customary international law. 
 
 
 
 
 
262          Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law        Vol. 2 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Society has long maintained age distinctions for activities 
such as: purchasing guns, smoking5, purchasing or 
consuming alcohol, serving on juries6, consenting to sex, 
signing contracts7, working,8 watching certain movies at the 
cinema,9 marrying,10 driving, renting cars or apartments, 
voting, and making healthcare decisions.11 The rationale for 
maintaining age distinctions for certain activities is that 
children are presumed not to have the capacity to handle 
“adult” responsibilities. This rationale has been reinforced by 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587 (2001) 
(concluding that children “lack the judgment to make an intelligent 
decision about whether to smoke” Id.).  
6 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (recognizing that most states prohibit 
children under 18 from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without 
parental consent). 
7 Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
95 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (recognizing 
that “a minor may not make an enforceable bargain.” Id.).   
8 Id. (recognizing that minors “may not lawfully work…”Id.). 
9 Id. (recognizing that minors “may not lawfully…attend exhibitions 
of constitutionally protected adult motion pictures.”Id.). See also Markell 
v. Markell, No. 805 OF 1993, 2000 WL 34201486, at 5, 7 (Pa. Ct. Com. 
Pl. June 28, 2000) (finding that father had let his minor children watch 
Fight Club, There’s Something About Mary, and Blade, and held that 
these were movies “[t]he children are too young to see”); The 
Classification and Rating Admin., Reasons for Movie Ratings, available 
at http://www.filmratings.com/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2007) (stating in its 
Question & Answers section that “[c]hildren under 17 are not allowed to 
attend R-rated motion pictures unaccompanied by a parent or adult 
guardian.” Id.) 
10 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 95 (Recognizing that persons “below a 
certain age may not marry without parental consent.”Id.). 
11 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (explaining that 
“parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity 
for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions…Most 
children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound 
judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical 
care or treatment.”Id.); See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 
(2000). 
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many decisions.12  Recently, the United States Supreme Court 
has ruled that juveniles who commit serious crimes are less 
blameworthy than adults.13  Legislatures and courts must 
extend this logic to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. 
In Roper, the Court concluded that juveniles were different, 
at least for purposes of the ultimate punishment of the death 
penalty, because juveniles are immature, irresponsible, more 
susceptible to negative influences, including peer pressure.14 
“Even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is [not] 
evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”15  
 
 I.      JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The United States played a leadership role in establishing 
a separate system of criminal justice for juveniles. In 1899, 
Illinois became the first government in the United States to 
establish a juvenile court, a court that was structured 
differently from the “regular” criminal court.16 The main goal 
of the juvenile court is to secure guidance and to ensure the 
child’s best interest.17 The Supreme Court has noted that the 
biggest distinction between the juvenile and adult criminal 
                                                 
12 Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that judges may authorize abortions for minors since 
constitutional rights of children and adults are unequal due to the 
“peculiar vulnerability of children,” and “their inability to make critical 
decisions in an informed, mature manner . . . ” Id.). 
13 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (recognizing the 
“diminished culpability of juveniles”). See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (stating that “[t]he reasons while juveniles are 
not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also 
explains why their irresponsible conducts is not as morally reprehensible 
as that of an adult.”Id.) “[L]ess culpability should attach to a crime 
committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an 
adult.” Id. 
14 Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
15 Id. (emphasis added). 
16 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) (tracing the history and 
theory underlying the development of the juvenile court system in an 
effort to clarify the Court's logic in reaching its ruling). 
17 Rabindranath Tagore, The Juvenile Justice System in the United 
States and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 12 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 469, 476 (1992).   
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justice systems is rehabilitation, which is based on the 
understanding that children are less culpable and more 
amenable to rehabilitation than adults who commit similar 
crimes.18 Indeed, juvenile offenders received minimal 
procedural protections in juvenile court because they were 
promised that the court would act in the “best interest of the 
child.”19 This original notion of juvenile justice has been 
largely abandoned by the courts. In considering these deeply 
rooted principles of rehabilitation and acting in the child’s 
best interest, it is clear that the United States has fallen out of 
step with the rest of the world when it comes to the treatment 
of juvenile offenders.20  
Today, juvenile sentences are often as stiff as those 
reserved for adult offenders. This “get tough on juvenile 
crime” approach is the product of a public misperception of 
youth crime—a view shaped by the tremendous amount of 
media coverage coupled with the pandering of politicians.21  
                                                 
18 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 546 (1971); see also 
Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16. 
19 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265-66 (1984); see also Gault, 387 
U.S. at 1. 
20 See Adam Liptak, Locked Away Forever After Crimes as 
Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at A1; Adam Liptak, Years of 
Regret Follow a Hasty Guilty Plea Made, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at 
A16. 
21 See, e.g., Robert B. Acton, Note, Youth, Family And The Law: 
Defining Rights And Establishing Recognition: Gubernatorial Initiatives 
and Rhetoric of Juvenile Justice Reform, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 277 (1996) 
(examines governors’ “initiatives and rhetoric” and finds that governors 
who speak out on juvenile justice issues overwhelmingly favor measures 
designed to send a “get tough” message); Helen Leiner, Juvenile Justice: 
Act Now!, 22 CHAMPION 11, (Jun. 1998); Lisa Popyk, Luke's 
Tormented World: The Kid Next Door Turned Killer, CINCINNATI 
POST, Nov. 9, 1998, at A1; Steve Fainaru, Alaska School Murders: A 
Window on Teen Rage, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1998, at A1; Lisa 
Popyk, Violence is Seductive to New Breed of Killers, CINCINNATI 
POST, Nov. 9, 1998, at A1, available at http://www.cincypost.com/news/ 
2kill110998.html (last visited August 20, 2007); Lisa Popyk, Blood in the 
School Yard - Part 1 of 4-Part Series: A Young Boy Explodes and Turns a 
Classroom into a Killing Ground, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 7, 1998, at 
A1, http://www.cincypost.com/news/1998/1kill110798.html (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2007). 
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In spite of news headlines detailing heinous crimes 
committed by juveniles, including a series of school-
shootings,22 there has been a decline in youth violent crime.23 
However, public perceptions of youth violence have 
contributed to widespread support of harsher sentences and 
the creation of tougher crime legislation.24 Examples of harsh 
legislation are the enactment of mandatory minimum 
                                                 
22 See J.R. Moehringer, Boys Sentenced for Arkansas School 
Murders, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1998, at A1; Popyk, Blood in the School 
Yard, supra note 21, at A1; See also Schall, 467 U.S. 253; Gault, 387 
U.S. 1; See also Tom Kenworthy, Up to 25 Die in Colorado School 
Shooting; Two Student Gunmen are Found Dead, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 
1999, at A1 (in April 1999, two students killed twelve students, one 
teacher, and themselves in their Littleton, Colorado high school—more 
than 20 others were seriously wounded.); Sam Howe Verhovek, Terror in 
Littleton: The Overview, Bodies Are Removed From School in Colorado, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999, at A1. 
23 See Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report, at 65 
(2006), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/ 
NR2006.pdf (presenting juvenile arrests trends) (last visited July 30, 
2007) (stating “[b]etween 1994 and 2002, the number of murders 
involving a juvenile offender fell 65%, to its lowest in 1964.”  Further, 
“[c]iting FBI and other data sources, the Report demonstrates that the rate 
of juvenile violent crime arrests has consistently decreased since 1994, 
falling to a level not seen since at least the 1970s.” See id. at iii 
(Foreword)).  
24 See, e.g., Robert O. Dawson, The Third Justice System: The New 
Juvenile-Criminal System of Determinate Sentencing for the Youthful 
Violent Offender in Texas, 19 ST. MARY’S L.J. 943, 949, 953 (1988); 
Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case of Juvenile 
Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 966 (1995); Shari Del Carlo, 
Comment, Oregon Voters Get Tough on Juvenile Crime: One Strike and 
You Are Out!, 75 OR. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (1996); Robert Heglin, Note, A 
Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means:“Three Strikes and You’re Out,” 
20 J. LEGIS. 213, 213 (1994); Deborah L. Mills, Note, United States v. 
Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System From 
Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 932 (1996); See 
generally Richard Lacayo, Lock 'Em Up! . . . . ; With Outraged Americans 
Saying that Crime is Their No. 1 Concern, Politicians are Again Talking 
Tough. But are They Talking Sense, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 50, available 
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,980077,00.html 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
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sentences and the use of sentencing guidelines.25 
Consequently, juveniles are sentenced to LWOP because 
some states are inconsiderate of the offender’s age.26  
In Thompson v Oklahoma, the United States Supreme 
Court held that a juvenile may be sentenced to death if at the 
time of the commission of the offense the juvenile was at 
least 16 years old.27 This view was reaffirmed in Stanford v. 
Kentucky 
28 before it was overruled in 2005 by the Roper 
decision.29  However, on the subject of juveniles sentenced to 
LWOP, 42 states currently have laws that allow youth 
offenders to receive such lengthy sentences.30  In 
                                                 
25 See generally Christine M. Blegen, Creating Options for Dealing 
with Juvenile Offenders (Juvenile Crime Bill), 52 J. MO. B. 46 (1996); 
Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States 
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search 
for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
185 (1993); Norval Morris, Preface to Symposium on a Decade of 
Sentencing Guidelines: Revisiting the Role of the Legislature, 28 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 181 (1993). 
26 See HRW Report, supra note 4 at 123 (Appendix D, State 
Population Data Table. In twenty-seven of the forty-two states that permit 
sentencing of juveniles to life without parole, the sentence is mandatory 
for anyone, regardless of age, found guilty of certain enumerated crimes). 
See infra note 30 for number of states with no age limit on the imposition 
of LWOP. 
27 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). 
28 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
29 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75(2005). 
30  At least fourteen states can impose LWOP to a person of any age: 
Rhode Island, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
West Virginia, and Maine. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (2002), R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 12-19.2-4 (2002) (LWOP sentence is discretionary); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1010 (1999 & Supp. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 1011(1999 & Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. § 985.56 (amended 2007), FLA. 
STAT. § 985.557 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 985.56 (3) (2007) (“if the child is 
found to have committed the offense punishable by death or life 
imprisonment, the child shall be sentenced as an adult”); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 571-22 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 706-656 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory LWOP for 
specified felonies); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4004 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 3101 (4)(e) (2003 and West Supp. 2005), ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1251 (West Supp. 2005) (permitting life sentences), see 
State v. St. Pierre, 584 A.2d 618, 621 (Me. 1990) (the time for LWOP 
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Washington, an eight-year-old offender may receive a life 
sentence.31 Eight states, including the District of Columbia, 
have barred juvenile LWOP sentences.32  
 
 
 
 
 A.  Constitutionality of Life Sentences 
                                                                                                     
sentences are discretionary under § 1251); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 
2-202(b)(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2005) (discretionary LWOP for 
defendants under 18); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.030 (LexisNexis 2001 
& Supp. 2003) (discretionary LWOP sentence for murder); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 630-1-a (LexisNexis 2006) (mandatory LWOP sentence a 
person convicted of first degree murder); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2005) 
(mandatory LWOP sentence for anyone 17 or under convicted of first-
degree murder); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (West 1998 & Supp. 
2005) (mandatory life imprisonment for murder); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN § 331.21 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005) (life imprisonment translates to 
LWOP); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-7605 (6) (1985 & Supp. 2005), see also 
State v. Corey, 529 S.E.2d 20, 23 (S.C. 2000) (interpreting the silence of 
age limit in § 7605 (6) as requiring no age limit); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-202 (c)(2) (2003 & Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-2 (2005) 
(mandatory LWOP for first degree murder). 
31 See State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1102 (Wash. 1993); See also 
Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1308 (Pa. 1992) (a similar 
Pennsylvania case where a nine-year-old fourth-grader was sentenced to 
LWOP.  In reversing the sentence, Justice Flaherty stated that public 
policy prohibits the prosecution of a nine-year-old for murder and that it 
was “attempted in this instance shocks [his] conscience.” Id. at 1315 
(Flaherty, J., concurring)). 
32 Jurisdictions barring juvenile LWOP sentences include Washington 
DC, Kansas, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Texas, Arkansas, and New 
Mexico. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-2104(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4622 
(2000 & SUPP. 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2204(3) (West 2003) 
(prohibiting LWOP for anyone under 18, maximum sentence is life with 
parole only if mandatory, other life with parole is discretionary); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(5), N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27(1)(b); OR. REV. 
STAT. §161.620 (2005), State v. Davilla, 972 P.2d 902, 904 (Or. Ct. App. 
1998) (interpreting §161.620 to bar juvenile LWOP); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 54.04 (d)(3)(A) (Vernon 2006); ALASKA STAT. § 12.15.125(a), 
(h), & (j) (LexisNexis 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10 (Supp. 2005). 
See also CAL PENAL CODE §190.5B (prohibiting LWOP sentences for 
juveniles under age 16); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3 (b)(2) (prohibiting LWOP 
sentences for juveniles under age 16). 
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Beginning in the early 1980s, the Supreme Court decided 
a few cases regarding the constitutionality of life sentences.33 
In Solem v Helm, the Court found a LWOP sentence 
disproportionate and articulated a three-part test that must be 
considered when analyzing proportionality of sentencing to 
the crime.34  First, the Court will consider the gravity of the 
offense and the harshness of the penalty.35 Second, sentences 
imposed on other criminals (for more or less serious offenses) 
in the same jurisdiction should be considered. Finally, the 
Court considers whether the sentences imposed are similar to 
those in other jurisdictions.36 
Using the three-part test, the Supreme Court, in Penry v 
Lynaugh, held that life imprisonment for murder in the first 
degree, even where the convicted person is barely into his 
teens, is neither cruel nor unusual.37 Most federal courts have 
adopted a dim view on sentencing when balancing the Solem 
factors and have focused largely on the gravity of the offense 
without giving due weight to the juvenile’s culpability and 
other individual mitigating circumstances.38  
 
 B.  Federal Court’s Approach to Juvenile LWOP 
 
Challenges to juvenile LWOP sentences have been 
largely unsuccessful in state and federal courts.  The 
imposition of life imprisonment without parole on a juvenile 
                                                 
33 Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265 (1980) (There, petitioner 
unsuccessfully argued that “life imprisonment was ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the three felonies that formed the predicate for his 
sentence and that therefore the sentence violated the ban on cruel and 
unusual punishments of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
34 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291-92 (1983). 
35 Id. at 278. 
36 Id. 
37 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).  
38 See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 8 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that “a particular offense that falls within legislatively prescribed 
limits will not be considered disproportionate unless the sentencing judge 
abused his discretion” (quoting United States v. Vasquez, 966 F.2d 254, 
261 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
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was challenged in Harris v Wright.39  There, the Court held 
that “youth has no obvious bearing on this problem…life 
imprisonment without parole is, for young and old alike, only 
an outlying point on the continuum of prison sentences.”40  
The Court reasoned that these sentences are consistent with 
evolving standards of decency and not rejected by U.S culture 
and laws. This was consistent with the majority judgment in 
Harmelin v. Michigan, which held that for non-death penalty 
cases a proportionality test did not require individualization.41  
Following this line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, in Rice v. Cooper, upheld the 
constitutionality of a juvenile LWOP sentence because the 
sentencing judge determined the sentence to be proportionate 
to the crime, even though the court recognized that the 
sentence was exceptionally severe for a juvenile.42 These 
cases and their progeny, show that federal courts give serious 
weight to the nature of the offense and not to the age of the 
offender. 
 
 C.  State Courts’ Approach to Juvenile LWOP 
 
State courts have been ambivalent in considering 
individual factors affecting a juvenile’s culpability. Some 
state courts have taken a progressive view by considering the 
age of the offender, whereas some have not. In Workmen v. 
Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld a 
Kentucky law mandating life without parole for adults 
                                                 
39 Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996). 
40 Id. at 585. See also Rodriquez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 568 (7th Cir. 
1995) (refusing to consider age of 15-year-old offender). 
41 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (individualization 
is where a court gives each juvenile's case unique consideration). Under 
this approach, the court gives attention to both legal factors (e.g., nature 
of the offense, prior adjudications) and extra-legal factors (e.g., remorse, 
terrible upbringing, motivation to accept intervention, capability for 
reform). 
42 Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998).  See also State 
v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 832 (N.C. 1998) (reasoning that that the crime 
committed was “not the type attributable to…a child”, the juvenile 
deserved no “special consideration.” Id. at 832.). 
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convicted of rape, but found “a different situation prevails 
when punishment of this stringent nature is applied to a 
juvenile.”43 The court held that life imprisonment without 
parole for two 14 year olds “shocks the general conscience of 
society today and is intolerable to fundamental fairness.”
44 
The Indiana Supreme Court shared similar views when it 
concluded that age is a “significant mitigating circumstance” 
when it comes to sentencing juveniles.45 
The Nevada Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in 
Naovarath v. State.46 Naovarath involved the 
constitutionality of a life sentence imposed on a 13-year-old 
convicted of murder. Applying the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment,” the Nevada 
court concluded that life without parole is a cruel and unusual 
sentence for a child offender. The Court stated, in part: 
 
We do not question the right of society to 
some retribution against a child murderer, but 
given the undeniably lesser culpability of 
children for their bad actions, their capacity 
for growth and society’s special obligation to 
children, almost anyone will be prompted to 
ask whether [a juvenile] deserves the degree of 
retribution represented by the hopelessness of 
a life sentence without possibility of parole, 
even for the crime of  murder. We conclude 
that…life without possibility of parole is 
excessive punishment for this thirteen-year-old 
boy.47 
 
                                                 
43 Workmen v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1968). 
44 Id. at 378 (emphasis added). 
45 Trowbrigde v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 150 (Ind. 1999) (finding 
consideration of age consistent with an Indiana statute prohibiting life in 
prison without parole sentences for youth under sixteen. See IND. CODE § 
35-50-2-3(b) (2004)). 
46 Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989). 
47 Id. at 948 (emphasis added). 
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In stark contrast, many state courts have held that juvenile 
LWOP sentences are constitutional.48 For instance, in State v. 
Pilcher, the court held that a LWOP sentence for a 15-year-
old convicted of murder was not unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment.49 Similarly, the Washington Court of 
Appeals affirmed a life sentence for a 13-year-old convicted 
of murder by rejecting the idea that the proportionality 
analysis should include consideration of the offender’s age 
and finding that the analysis includes only “a balance 
between the crime and the sentence imposed.”50  Many state 
courts have adopted similar approaches in sentencing 
juveniles to life imprisonment.51 Roper changed the legal 
landscape and calls into question this sentencing approach. 
 Like a death sentence, a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole disregards the special characteristics of 
juveniles and their capability to reform.52 In fact, life without 
parole sentences have been compared to a “death sentence by 
                                                 
48 State v. Standard, 569 S.E.2d 325, 329 (S.C. 2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1195 (2003) (holding that “modern society apparently 
condones” such punishment). 
49 State v. Pilcher, 655 So.2d 636, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
50 State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990), cert. 
denied, 499 U.S. 960 (1991). 
51 See, e.g., Iowa v. Speaks, 576 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Iowa Ct. App., 
1998) (affirming a 15-year-old’s LWOP sentence for first degree murder); 
State v. Garcia, 561 N.W.2d 599, 609 (N.D. 1997) (holding a LWOP 
sentence for a sixteen-year-old did not violate Eighth Amendment) cert. 
denied, 200 U.S. 118 (1997); Swinford v. State, 653 So.2d 912, 918 
(Miss. 1995) (upholding LWOP sentence for 14-year-old); State v. Foley, 
456 So.2d 979, 984 (La. 1984) (affirming LWOP sentence of 15-year-old 
convicted of rape against); White v. State, 374 So.2d 843, 847 (Miss. 
1979) (holding a 16-year-old’s LWOP sentence for armed robbery did not 
violate Eighth Amendment); People v. Fernandez, 883 P.2d 491, 495 
(Colo. Ct. App., 1994). 
52 See Elizabeth Cepparulo, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile 
Purgatory: Is Life Really Better Than Death?, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. 
L. REV. 225 (2006) (stating that “[t]here are fervent constitutional 
arguments to support a Supreme Court declaration that mandatory LWOP 
is equivalent to the death penalty for juveniles, and should thus be deemed 
cruel and unusual.”Id.)  
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incarceration.”53 LWOP allows no more room for 
rehabilitation than the death penalty. When a juvenile is 
sentenced to LWOP, any opportunity to learn from the 
mistake, change, and have a chance at reintegration is 
completely eliminated. LWOP sentences constitute an 
impermissible and unconstitutional punishment for juveniles 
because the special characteristics juveniles inherently have 
for reform, as recognized in Roper, are not taken into 
consideration.   
 
 II.    INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF 
CHILDREN 
 
 In November 1959, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which 
recognized that “the child, by reason of his physical and 
mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, 
including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after 
birth.”54 The United States was one of the 78 members of the 
U.N. General Assembly, which voted unanimously to adopt 
the Declaration. 
 Further, similar to the domestic goals of juvenile justice, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
[hereinafter “ICCPR”], to which the United States is a party, 
specifically acknowledges the need for special treatment of 
children in the criminal justice system and emphasizes the 
                                                 
53 “You are trading a slow form of death for a faster one.” See Adam 
Liptak, Serving Life, With No Chance of Redemption, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
2005, at 4 (quoting Paul Wright and  Randy Arroyo, whose death 
sentence was commuted to life without parole as a result of the Roper 
decision, agreed). 
54 G. A. Res. 1386 (XIV), November 20, 1959, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/25.htm (last visited March 25, 
2007). See also The American Convention on Human Rights, Series no. 
36, p. 1, Organization of American States, Official Record, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, signed by the OAS on November 22, 1969, entered 
into force July 18, 1978, states in Article 19: “Every minor child has the 
right to the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor on 
the part of his family, society, and the state.” 
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/Text/oashr5.html (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
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importance of their rehabilitation.55 When the United States 
ratified the ICCPR, it attached a limiting reservation that 
states: 
 
That the policy and practice of the United 
States are generally in compliance with and 
supportive of the Covenant’s provisions 
regarding treatment of juveniles in the 
criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the 
United States reserves the right, in exceptional 
circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults, 
notwithstanding paragraphs 2 (b) and 3 of 
article 10 and paragraph 4 of article 14.56  
 
Nothing in this reservation suggests that the United States 
sought to reserve the right to sentence children as harshly as 
adults who commit similar crimes.57  Likewise, the United 
                                                 
55 United Nations International Covenant for Civil and Political 
Rights, Art. 10 (3), Dec. 16, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S., at 175, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 
2007) (juvenile reformation and social rehabilitation should be an 
essential aim of treatment.) (emphasis added).  See Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment no. 1, Forty-fourth Session (1992), para. 
13, in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, p. 155, 
http://www.bayefsky.com/general/all_hri_gen_1_rev_7.pdf (last visited 
March 25, 2007) (The Human Rights Committee has interpreted the 
ICCPR’s provisions on child offenders to apply to “all persons under the 
age of eighteen” and requires each State, when incarcerating juveniles, 
must focus on “reformation and social rehabilitation.”).   
56 United Nations Treaty Collection, Declarations & Reservations, 
United States of America, at para. 5, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) (emphasis added).   
See also id. at para. 2 The U.S. further reserved the “right to impose 
capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman” 
including juveniles (emphasis added). 
57 See Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1992), reprinted in 
31 I.L.M. 645, 651 (1992) (The reservations are silent on juvenile life 
without parole sentences). (The U.S. reservation dealing with specific 
types of sentencing is contained in reservation number two, where the 
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States co-sponsored Article 14(4)—an article similar to its 
domestic laws—that mandates punishments for children 
charged with crimes must consider the age of the offender 
and promote their rehabilitation. 
 
 A.  Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child [hereinafter 
“CRC”] is the “most widely and rapidly ratified human rights 
treaty in history.”58 The CRC was adopted on November 20, 
1989 in New York. It is the first international human rights 
instrument to adopt a common ethical and legal framework 
for the treatment of incarcerated juveniles. Currently 191 out 
of 193 countries have ratified or accepted the Convention.59 
The United States and Somalia60 are the only two countries in 
the world that have not ratified the CRC, although both have 
signed it.61 As a signatory to the CRC, the United States may 
not take actions that would defeat the Convention’s object 
and purpose. 
 The CRC is clear, precise, and unambiguous when it 
comes to sentencing juveniles to life without possibility of 
parole. Article 37(a) of the CRC provides that: “Neither 
capital punishment nor life imprisonment without the 
possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed 
by persons below eighteen years of age.” 62 Further, Article 
                                                                                                     
United States reserved the right to impose capital punishment on any 
person , including those persons below eighteen years of age.).   
58 See UNICEF, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2006). 
59 Id.  
60 See id. (according to the United Nations’ agency for children, 
UNICEF, “Somalia is currently unable to proceed to ratification as it has 
no recognized government.”Id.).  
61 Id. (“By signing the Convention, the United States has signalled its 
intention to ratify—but has yet to do so.” Id.) The United States signed 
the CRC on February 16, 1995. John F. Harris, U.S. to Sign U.N. Pact on 
Child Rights, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1995, at A3.  
62 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37(a), G.A. res. 
44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 
(1989), entered into force Sept. 2, 1990 (emphasis added).  
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40 of the CRC emphasizes that the primary aim of juvenile 
justice is the rehabilitation and reintegration of the child into 
society.63 
 
 B.  Juvenile Justice Around the World 
 
 In determining the standards of decency, American courts 
must consider international law.  Although there has been 
some outcry concerning whether the Supreme Court may 
look to international standards, the Roper Court firmly stated 
that looking at standards in other countries is common.64  In 
Roper, the Court stated that “at least from the time of the 
Court’s decision in Trop v. Dulles, decided in 1958, the Court 
has referred to the laws of other countries and to international 
authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments.’” 65  The Court emphasized “the stark reality” 
that the United States is the only country in the world where 
juveniles have the possibility of receiving the death penalty.66   
Furthermore, the respondents in Roper argued Article 37 of 
                                                                                                     
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 
2007) [hereinafter “Article 37(a)]. 
63 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 40(1), 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 
2007) [hereinafter “Article 40(1)”]. 
64 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575; See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
316 n.21 (2002) (mentioning in a footnote that international law 
prohibited execution of the mentally retarded); Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982) (observing that “the doctrine of felony 
murder has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in 
Canada and a number of Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in 
Continental Europe”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) 
(stating, “It is…not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the 
world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where 
death did not ensue.”). 
65 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (emphasis added) See also Atkins, 536 
U.S.  at 317; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion) 
(stating, “The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity” with 
the court’s assessment that the punishment of statelessness is contrary to 
evolving standards of decency). 
66 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
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the CRC bans juvenile death penalty.67  This same provision 
of the CRC bans juvenile LWOP.68 
 This draconian system of punishment is unparalleled 
internationally. The same sentences imposed on juveniles 
across America are absolutely verboten in Canada,69 United 
Kingdom,70 Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and almost the entire 
world, including “developing” countries. Even those nations 
that share our Anglo-American heritage do not subject 
juveniles to LWOP sentences.71  For example, the European 
Court of Human Rights, governing the countries belonging to 
the European Union, held in Hussain v. United Kingdom that 
a LWOP sentence of a 16-year-old convicted of murder was 
illegal.72 The European Court held a sentence of life 
                                                 
67 Id. at 576. 
68 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 60 ( “Neither 
capital punishment nor life imprisonment without the possibility of release  
. . .”Id.) (emphasis added). 
69 See Committee on the Rights of Child, 1994, State Party Report: 
Canada CRC/C/11/Add.3, para. 315-52, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf 
(click on “By County” link on left, then click on “C,” then Canada.  Click 
the next button until find 28/07/1994 State Party Report 
[CRC/c/11/Add.3] click on “E” for English version.) (last visited Dec. 22, 
2006) (“In the Canadian criminal justice system the most serious penalty 
that can be imposed on youths is a sentence of life imprisonment, with 
eligibility for parole within 5 to 10 years.” Id. at para. 351). 
70 See Committee on the Rights of Child, State Party Report: United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 28/03/94. 
CRC/C/11Add.1, paras. 574, 583, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (click 
on “By County” link on left, then click on “U,” then “United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland” link.  Click the next button until find 
28/03/1994 State Party Report [CRC/c/11/Add.1] click on “E” for English 
version.) (last visited Dec. 26, 2006) “The emphasis will not be on 
punishment but on providing children with the skills they need to give up 
their offending behaviour through an intensive supervision to ensure their 
successful reintroduction into society.” Id. at para. 574 (emphasis added); 
“Under the Children and Young persons Act of 1933, anyone found guilty 
of murder under the age of 18 at the time of the offence is sentenced to 
detention during Her Majesty’s Pleasure, not to life imprisonment.” Id. at 
para. 583 (emphasis added). 
71 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 576. 
72 Hussain v. United Kingdom, 22 E.H.R.R. 1 (1996), available at 
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/8.html (last visited Dec. 4, 
2006). 
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imprisonment with no possibility of parole would constitute 
“a failure to have regard of the changes which inevitable 
occur with maturation.”73  The CRC has been adopted and 
embraced by virtually every country except the United States.  
Significantly, none of the 191 countries that have ratified the 
treaty has registered a reservation to the CRC’s prohibition 
on juvenile life imprisonment without parole.74  In Africa, 31 
countries prohibit life without parole for children in their 
penal laws.75  “Only three other nations – Tanzania, South 
Africa, and Israel – have sentenced juveniles to life without 
parole, and they have a total of 12 such prisoners 
combined.”76  
 
 C.  International Human Rights Principles as     
Persuasive Authority 
 
The imposition of LWOP sentences on juveniles is 
offensive to the stated goal of rehabilitation.  These sentences 
clearly violate international law—more specifically, Article 
                                                 
73 Id. at 53. 
74 See Howard Davidson, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
A Call for US Participation, http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winter05/ 
intro.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2007) (stating that the CRC “was drafted 
with the active involvement of representatives of the Reagan 
administration,” was “approved overwhelmingly” and “the United States 
stands alone among the world’s nations as the only country choosing not 
to support the CRC.”  See also HRW Report, supra note 4, at 99 (stating 
that “[n]otably, none of the state parties to the treaty has registered a 
reservation to the CRC's prohibition on life imprisonment without release 
for children”). 
75 See HRW Report, supra note 4, at 105 (These countries are Algeria, 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe).  
76 Bob Egelko, 180 teen killers locked up for life, report says, Change 
proposed to allow paroles, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 13, 2005, at 
B 3, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-in/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/10/13/ 
BAG00F7GFI1.DTL, (last visited Mar. 24, 2007) (emphasis added). 
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37(a) of the CRC.77  The issue is whether the United States is 
bound by international law and standards where it is a 
signatory and co-sponsor to a treaty but has not yet ratified it.  
The answer to this question must be “yes.”  Article 18 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties outlines the 
responsibilities a country undertakes when it signs a treaty—
the most basic responsibility for signatory countries is “to 
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose 
of a treaty.”78  If the United States wants to be free from this 
obligation, the appropriate means is to “unsign,” rather than 
ignore the basic tenets of the treaty.79 Signing a treaty 
explicitly prohibiting the sentencing of juveniles to life 
without the possibility of parole and subsequently continuing 
to impose such sentences commits violence to the purpose 
and object of such treaty. This is especially true because 
federal law permits mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences.80 
                                                 
77 Article 37(a), supra note 62 (Article 37(a) states “Neither capital 
punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be 
imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.” 
Id.).  
78 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 8 I.L.M. 679. See also Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 2061, 2067 n. 25 (2003) (noting that signing a treaty without 
ratifying it “may also invest the signatory with particular rights under the 
treaty” Id. at 2067 n.25.) (Indeed, some commentators have argued that a 
signatory country’s behavior that is inconsistent with the “major or 
indispensable provision” violates its treaty obligations. Id. at 2078 (citing 
Paul V. McDade, The Interim Obligation Between Signature and 
Ratification of a Treaty, 32 NETH. INT’L REV. 5, 42 (1985)). 
79 Swaine, supra note 78, at 2082 (recognizing that Article 18 “does 
not require that the interim obligation be observed for eternity, but instead 
only ‘until [the signatory] shall have made its intention clear not to 
become a party to the treaty’” “Unsigning” a treaty allows a country to 
revert “back to the status it might have retained all along …”, which is 
what occurred on May 6, 2002, when the United States unsigned the 
Rome Statute. Id. at 2062.). Unfortunately, the United States has a history 
of violating treaty obligations. See Case Concerning Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 69-70 (Mar. 31); 
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 475-76 (June 27). 
80 18 U.S.C.A. §1111 (West 2003) (requiring that anyone convicted 
of first degree murder be sentenced to death or life imprisonment). Under 
federal law, a life sentence carries no possibility of parole. See United 
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Apart from treaty obligations, international human rights 
principles are also “instructive” in determining appropriate 
punishments.81  
Accordingly, the United States cannot ignore the 
prevailing standards of decency and fairness when it comes to 
sentencing juveniles.  The current system allows reform to 
begin right away. Not only should state officials enact laws 
prohibiting life imprisonment without parole for juveniles, 
but the federal government has an obligation to ensure that 
states comply with this constitutional and international 
mandate.  Congress should enact laws to eliminate the 
sentence in the future, even though the international treaty 
signed by the United States has a direct effect on the state and 
federal government without the need for new legislation.82 
 
D.  Juvenile LWOP Violates Customary 
International Law 
 
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality 
of juvenile LWOP sentences. However, federal and state 
                                                                                                     
States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 209 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that 
“Congress eliminated all federal parole.” Id. at 209.). 
81 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
82 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (stating that 
“[t]he rule of equality established by [the treaty]…stands on the same 
footing of supremacy as do the provisions of the Constitution and laws of 
the United States. It operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, 
state or national; and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by 
the courts.”). Therefore, rights conferred by international law in a treaty 
signed by the United States have the same legal effect as laws enacted by 
Congress. However, a federal statute banning juvenile life without parole, 
serves both a symbolic and practical purpose because Congress will 
present a uniform view on how juveniles must be treated in the United 
States and such law will better enforce domestic adherence to the CRC. 
Congressional statute on point would be most helpful because American 
courts have been reluctant in enforcing human rights treaty provisions 
absent domestic legislation. See David Sloss, The Domestication of 
International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and 
Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 203 (1999) (concluding, 
after reviewing many cases, that “judges have failed to appreciate the 
possibilities for judicial application of human rights treaties to which the 
United States is a party” Id. at 203.). 
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governments’ policies of imposing life without parole 
sentences on juveniles, violates U.S. constitutional law, 
which requires both individual states and the federal 
government to uphold human rights treaties made under the 
authority of the United States.  The U.S. Constitution states 
that:  
 
Th[e] Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the authority of the United 
States  shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the Constitution or Law 
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.83 
 
When interpreting this constitutional principle, the 
Supreme Court has stated that, “[i]nternational law is part of 
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the 
courts of justice of the appropriate jurisdiction . . . ”84  
Treaties of the United States have been held to be binding on 
states, independent of the will and power of state 
legislatures.85  Such treaties stand on the same footing of 
supremacy as do the provisions of the Constitution and laws 
of the United States and “[o]perates of itself without the aid 
of any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied and 
given authoritative effect by the courts.”86  Human rights 
                                                 
83 U.S. CONST, art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).  
84 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See Murray v. The 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Statutes “ought never 
to be construed to violate . . . rights . . . further than is warranted by the 
law of nations…”); See also Harold Honju Koh, Is International Law 
Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825 (1998) (noting that 
customary international law is federal law and preempts inconsistent state 
practices).  
85 See Asakura, 265 U.S.332 (holding that a treaty made under the 
authority of the United States stands on the same footing of supremacy as 
do the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States.). 
86 See id. at 341 (citing Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 213 
U.S. 268, 272 (1909)); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884); 
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treaties, like other treaty obligations of the U.S. government, 
are also binding on state governments.87  Further, Article 50 
of the ICCPR provides that the provisions of the Covenant 
“shall extend to all parts of federal States without any 
limitations or exceptions.”88 
Some argue that the U.S. does not violate international 
vis-à-vis the CRC’s explicit ban on juvenile LWOP 
sentences89 because it has not ratified the CRC. Even if this 
were true, the U.S. violates customary international law.  
Customary international laws are “widely held fundamental 
principles of civilized society that [are so basic that] they 
constitute binding norms on the community of nations.”90  As 
described above, the international rejection of juvenile life 
without parole sentences is so overpowering that it has 
attained customary international law status.  Unlike treaties, 
customary international law is not written.  The Supreme 
Court has long established that customary international law is 
binding on the government of the United States because it is 
“part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by 
the courts of justice . . . ” 91  
                                                                                                     
Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 540 (1884); Foster v. 
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)). 
87 Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 
764 (1988). See also Asakura, 265 U.S. at 341 (“The rule of equality 
established by [the treaty] cannot be rendered nugatory in any part of the 
United States by municipal ordinances or state laws. It stands on the same 
footing of supremacy, as do the provisions of the Constitution and laws of 
the United States. It operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, 
state or national; and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by 
the courts.” Id.). 
88 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at Article 
50, http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm, (last visited Dec. 12, 
2006) [hereinafter “Article 50”]. 
89 See Article 37(a), supra note 62. 
90 Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439 (D.N.J. 
1999). 
91 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.  See also Xuncax v. 
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D.Mass.1995) (it is well settled that the 
body of principles that comprise customary international law is subsumed 
and incorporated by federal common law). See also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §111, 
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To establish that a certain rule has attained custom status, 
two elements must be satisfied.  First, the rule must be a 
widespread and consistent governmental practice.92  Second, 
the rule must be followed out of a sense of legal obligation in 
the international community or opinio juris accompanying 
the practice.93  The practice establishing a customary rule 
means the rule is followed regularly or that state practice is 
“common, consistent and concordant.” 94  Given the size of 
the world, the practice does not have to be followed in every 
country or be completely uniform.95 Instead, the practice 
must be followed in many countries rising to the level of a 
general consensus.96  
                                                                                                     
reporter’s note 4 (1987) (noting that international law is ‘part of our 
law’…and is federal law.). 
92 Olufemi Elias, The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary 
International Law, 44 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 501 (1995) (noting that 
customary international law result from the uniform and consistent 
conduct of States); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. 
Iceland) (Merits) [1974] ICJ Reports 3 at 50. 
http://www.oceanlaw.net/cases/fishj1mer.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
93 See, e.g., KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 53 (2d rev. ed. 1993) (stating “[a]n international custom comes into 
being when a certain practice becomes sufficiently ripe to justify at least a 
presumption that it has been accepted by other interested states as an 
expression of law.” Id.); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 3 (2d ed. 2003) (stating [c]ustomary international 
law actually has two primary components which must generally be 
conjoined: (1) patterns of practice or behavior, and (2) patterns of legal 
expectation, ‘acceptance’ as law, or opinio juris.”);  Elias, supra note 92, 
at 501 (“Doctrine generally holds that customary international law results 
from (a) the uniform and consistent conduct of States, undertaken with (b) 
the conscious conviction on the part of States that they are acting in 
conformity with law, or that they were required so to act by law.” Id.). 
94 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 92, at 50.    
95 See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187 (D.Mass.1995) (stating that “[i]t is 
not necessary that [customary international law] be fully defined and 
universally agreed upon before a given action…is clearly proscribed 
under international law…” Id.). 
96 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988) 
(Explaining that there “need not [be] unanimity among nations. Rather, 
[the plaintiff must show] a general recognition among states that a 
specific practice is prohibited.” Id.). 
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There is customary international law against the 
sentencing of juveniles to LWOP.97  The widespread 
adherence to the CRC and consistent worldwide refusal to 
impose the sentence on children indicate that both of these 
elements are satisfied.  The fact that the CRC is the product 
of extensive discussion involving multiple States indicates 
that the CRC represents a consensus that virtually every 
country in the world, including the United States, was willing 
to accept.  The 191 nations that have ratified the CRC have 
refrained from sentencing juveniles to LWOP due to their 
legal obligation under the treaty. Thus, the CRC is a part of 
the customary international law.  Once a rule of customary 
international law is established, that rule becomes binding 
even on states that have not formally agreed to it.98  The 
United States, a historical leader in promoting human rights 
and juvenile justice reform, has not attempted to change its 
law in light of this universally accepted practice and has 
fallen behind the practice of the rest of the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 See Human Rights Advocates, Submission to the Sixty-First 
Session of the Commission on Human Rights, The Death Penalty and Life 
Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Release for Youth Offenders Who 
Were Under the Age of 18 at the Time of the Offense, Spring 2005, 
http://www.humanrightsadvocates.org/images/Juvenile%20Sentences.doc 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2006). At least one federal judge has stated that the 
CRC “has attained the status of customary international law.” Sadeghi v. 
INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 1994) (Kane, J., dissenting). 
98 There is a wealth of state practice when it comes to refusing to 
sentence juvenile offenders to LWOP. Only the United States and 
Somalia have not ratified the CRC. Further, because the United States 
signed the CRC in 1994, it cannot be considered a persistent objector to 
the treaty. See Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and Customary 
Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical Framework, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 147, 163 (1996) (a persistent objector is a state that has 
consistently and expressly protested the rule during the rule’s inception 
and development and, consequently, can claim the right not to be bound 
by the rule.).  
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III. JUVENILE LWOP VIOLATES THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 
 
The U.S. Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual 
punishment.” 99  This provision is applicable to the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.100  Under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Roper, a LWOP sentence constitutes “cruel and unusual 
punishment.”101  
In Roper, the Court held that death sentences for juveniles 
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.102  The Court 
reasoned that the “evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society” demonstrate that it is 
disproportionate to execute a defendant for a murder 
committed while the defendant is under the age of 18.103 
Even though many state laws permitted the imposition of 
death sentences on juveniles, the Court indicated that it 
exercised independent judgment to determine whether such a 
penalty is disproportionate.104 The Court exercised 
independent judgment by considering medical, psychological, 
and common experience which all show that children under 
18 years are less culpable and amenable to rehabilitation than 
adults.105  The Court concluded that a sentence cannot be 
imposed on juveniles, if it implies that an offender cannot be 
rehabilitated.  
                                                 
99 The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
100 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). See also Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 
1977) (stating “[i]t was not until 1962 that the Supreme Court applied the 
Eighth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment” Id.). 
101 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
102 Roper at 578. 
103 Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, (1958) 
(plurality opinion)). 
104   Id. at 564. 
105 Id. at 568-76 (Court examined recent studies about brain 
development and psychology).  
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The Court’s reasoning in Roper applies with equal force 
to juvenile LWOP because this sentence, like a death 
sentence, implies that the juvenile cannot be rehabilitated.106  
In its analysis, the Court considered precedents where 
juveniles were treated differently than adults and took notice 
of the views of the international community.107  There, the 
Court commented on the severity of juvenile LWOP as 
follows: “it is worth noting that the punishment of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a 
severe sanction, in particular for a young person.” 108  The 
thrust of the Court’s reasoning is that juveniles are 
categorically different from adults in the criminal law 
context; therefore, courts must consider this categorical 
difference during sentencing. Courts should look at trends, 
contexts, and practices—nationally and internationally. The 
consensus is against LWOP nationally, as well as 
internationally. For instance, the majority of juveniles serving 
LWOP sentences are from four states: Florida (273), 
Louisiana (317), Michigan (306), and Pennsylvania (332).109 
                                                 
106 In oral argument in Roper, Justice Scalia, who eventually 
dissented from the Court’s opinion, concluded that the arguments that 
apply to juvenile death penalty apply equally to juvenile LWOP. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at page 6, lines 12-24, Roper v. Simmons, 
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-
633.pdf, (last visited Dec. 24, 2006); See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79 (it is 
important to note that Roper does not stand for the proposition that 
juvenile LWOP is unconstitutional. In fact, the death penalty sentence that 
was struck down in that case was replaced with LWOP.).  
107 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78 (The Court referenced several 
international covenants in concluding that the Eighth Amendment forbid 
juvenile death penalty.  Additionally, the Court has often given weight to 
the youthfulness of the offender in the criminal cases). See also Fare v. 
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (holding that courts must “take into 
account those special concerns that are present when young persons…are 
involved” in waiving Miranda rights.); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (in examining voluntariness of consent to search, 
courts must consider, inter alia, the youth of the accused). 
108  Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added). 
109 HRW Report, supra note 4, at 35 and Appendix D: State 
Population Data Table at 123.    
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In most states where juvenile LWOP is available, it is rarely 
imposed.110 
In Roper, the Court drew a bright line for juvenile 
culpability at age eighteen. The Court, after mentioning that 
certain characteristics such as lack of maturity, lower level of 
mental and emotional development, and inability to make 
sound judgments made juveniles less culpable for their 
crimes, “conclude[d] [that] the same reasoning applies to all 
juvenile offenders under 18.”111  Accordingly, sentencing 
juveniles, who are less culpable for their crimes, to LWOP 
like adults who commit similar offenses concludes that 
juveniles will never be rehabilitated, and such conclusion 
exceeds the bounds of decency.  The bounds the Court 
created in Roper are that juveniles are more amenable to 
rehabilitation and it is impossible to determine that juveniles 
are beyond redemption. 112  Therefore, sentences (such as 
death and LWOP sentences) excluding the possibility of 
rehabilitation of juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. 
 
IV.   JUVENILE LWOP ARE EXCESSIVE AND 
INEFFECTIVE DETERRENT FOR JUVENILES 
 
Juvenile LWOP sentences have been largely ineffective 
in achieving the common goals of the justice system: 
rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation.113  
Proponents of juvenile LWOP sentences argue it is a great 
                                                 
110 Id. (Montana (1), Rhode Island (2), Minnesota (2), New 
Hampshire (3)).  
111 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
112 Id. at 568-75 (“it is less supportable to conclude that even a 
heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievable 
depraved character.” Id. at 570.). 
113 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and 
American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1899 (1991) (The 
purpose of incapacitation is to protect society from dangerous persons by 
physical confinement or otherwise disabling them.); See also Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (stating that retribution is “the 
need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent 'moral 
quality’”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
2007 Juvenile Death Sentence Lives On 287 
 
  
deterrent to juveniles.  This argument is similar to the one 
made in Roper, where the Court rejected the idea that the 
death penalty had a deterrent effect on juvenile criminality.114  
There, the Court noted that juveniles lack the mental ability 
to weigh the possible consequences of their actions, therefore, 
the death penalty is not an effective deterrent.115  That 
argument applies to juvenile LWOP as well.  “The theory of 
deterrence…is predicated upon the notion that the increased 
severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from 
carrying out [unlawful] conduct.”116  The Court in Atkins 
reasoned that the “diminished ability to understand and 
process information, to learn from experience, to engage in 
logical reasoning, or to control impulses” makes defendants 
less morally culpable.117  For these reasons, the Court held 
the use of death penalty for mentally retarded defendants is 
unconstitutional.118 
Juveniles are somewhat analogous to mentally retarded 
defendants (using the same factors set out in Atkins) to the 
extent that juveniles have lesser ability to understand and 
process information, to learn from experience (by their 
definition, their experiences are limited), and children are 
often unable to engage in logical reasoning, which is why 
they are excluded from participating in many civil and 
political activities granted to adults.  Most people agree—or 
at least do not violently disagree—that children cannot fully 
appreciate or understand spending the rest of their lives 
behind bars for their criminality because they do not have the 
same maturity, judgment, or emotional development as 
adults.  
Children do not have the ability to control impulses as 
well as adults.  The Court, in Roper, found that juveniles are 
more susceptible to immature behavior, irresponsible 
behavior, negative influences, peer pressure, and lack control 
                                                 
114 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
115 Id. (the Court noted the availability of LWOP sentences. Id. at 
572.). 
116 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002). 
117 Id.  
118 Id. 
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over their immediate surroundings.119 Due to the diminished 
culpability of juveniles, the harsh LWOP sentence will not 
deter them from committing crimes because, categorically, 
they cannot comprehend the severity of the sentence. Further, 
the scarcity of life without parole for juveniles around the 
world—12 in total120—speaks volumes to the global 
recognition of the ineffectiveness of the sentence. The lack of 
maturity to fully weigh risks and understand the future 
consequences of their actions shows that LWOP sentences do 
not deter juvenile criminality.121 To argue otherwise would be 
the ultimate exercise in deceit.  
 
A. Juvenile LWOP Sentences Violate the Principle 
of Rehabilitation 
 
When it comes to juvenile offenders, the law must 
promote rehabilitation.  Juvenile LWOP frustrates this goal.  
Life imprisonment denies hope to juveniles who have the 
ability to improve their behavior and character.122  Sentencing 
juveniles to prison for the rest of their lives does not serve the 
stated goal of rehabilitation.  An example is where a trial 
judge refused to sentence an 11-year-old, convicted of 
murder, to life without parole.  The judge stated “Don’t ask 
the Judge to look into a crystal ball today and predict five 
years down the road.  Give the Juvenile system a chance to 
rehabilitate. Don’t predict today, at sentencing, whether the 
child will or will not be rehabilitated, but keep the options 
open.” 123 
                                                 
119 Roper, 543 U.S. at 553. See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815, 835 (1988).  
120 Davidson, supra note 74. 
121 See Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 948 (Nev. 1989) (holding 
LWOP sentence unconstitutional and questioned whether the sentence 
could serve as deterrent for teenagers). 
122 Id.  
123 Marc Mauer, Ryan S. King, and Malcolm C. Young, The Meaning 
of “Life”: Long Prison Sentences in Context, (The Sentencing Project, 
2004), 18, www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/lifers.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 
2006) (quoting Michigan state court judge Eugene Arthur Moore). See 
also Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive 
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In many cases, juvenile crimes are related to temporary 
and changing characteristics of immaturity and impulsivity. 
These characteristics should be taken into account when 
courts deal with children, if the best interest of the child is the 
primary consideration.  Rehabilitation focuses on the best 
interest of the child.  Rehabilitation, however, is abandoned 
when a child is sentenced to LWOP because there is no 
chance of integration.  When juveniles are sentenced to 
LWOP, they are “denied educational, vocational, and other 
opportunities to develop their minds and skills because 
prisons reserve these under-funded programs for individuals 
that will someday be released.”124  Providing juvenile 
offenders some chance of integration into society will give 
them something to work toward—rehabilitation. 
Juvenile offenders struggle with the anger and emotional 
turmoil of knowing they will die in prison, perhaps seventy 
years later. Juveniles do not have the capability to cope 
physically, mentally, and emotionally because they went to 
prison at a very young age.125 Consequently, many juveniles 
sentenced to LWOP commit or attempt to commit suicide.126 
They lack the incentive to try to improve their character or 
skills because they will never be released. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113, 126 (1996) (noting that predictions 
according to health professionals is that future violence among serious 
offenders could increase.). 
124 See HRW Report, supra note 4, at 5.  
125 See generally HRW Report, supra note 4, at 54, 57 (citing 
Institute of Crime, Justice and Corrections and the National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency-U.S. Department, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Juveniles in Adult Prisons and Jails: A 
National Assessment, (Oct. 2000)), www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/182503-
1.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006) (Adult inmates have had some experience 
in the ‘outside’ world and are generally more equipped to deal with the 
difficulties attendant to prison life than juveniles do. Juveniles came into 
the system young, not fully developed mentally, physically, and 
emotionally and are susceptible to severe abuses in prison.). 
126 HRW Report, supra note 4, at 54. 
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B. Juvenile LWOP Sentences Impose Excessive 
Retribution on Juveniles 
 
Juvenile LWOP sentences are improperly retributive. In 
Roper, the Court stated “[r]etribution is not proportional if the 
law’s most severe penalty [the death penalty] is imposed on 
one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a 
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”127  
This statement applies with equal force to juvenile LWOP 
sentences. More significantly, in states that have abolished 
the death penalty, LWOP is the harshest possible sentence for 
any adult. Therefore, sentencing juveniles to the most severe 
penalty allowed by law is cruel and unreasonable.  
While it is a well established principle that the 
combination of age, immaturity, and inability to understand 
consequences of their actions makes juveniles less culpable, 
juvenile LWOP sentences are completely inconsistent with 
this principle and thus impose excessive punishment on 
juveniles.  The same maximum sentence used to punish 
adults for the same crime—usually first-degree murder—is 
the same punishment imposed on juveniles convicted of the 
same crime. In Weems v. United States, the Court held that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits “all punishments which, by 
their excessive length or severity, are greatly disproportionate 
to the offenses charged.”128 Indeed, this punishment is much 
worse for juveniles. Consider this: a 14-year-old and a 40-
year-old are convicted of the same crime and sentenced to 
LWOP. The punishment is significantly different because the 
juvenile is likely to be incarcerated for a much longer period 
and misses the most formative parts of life. Ultimately, the 
juvenile is not able to prove that, with age and appropriate 
rehabilitative programs, he may be suitable for reintegration.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
127 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
128 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910).  
2007 Juvenile Death Sentence Lives On 291 
 
  
C. Juvenile LWOP Sentences Violate 
Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting 
Uncivilized Punishment 
 
In Trop, the Court held the constitutionality of a 
punishment is determined by “whether this penalty subjects 
the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized 
treatment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.”129  
Applying this principle, it is clear that sentencing juveniles to 
life without parole is not only rare (currently 12 in the rest of 
the world) but “its imposition is…wanton and freakish.”130  
The global disdain for sentences that permanently banish 
juveniles from society leads to the conclusion that such a 
punishment violates the global definition of “civilized 
treatment.” Additionally, juvenile LWOP sentences 
unreasonably and disproportionately incapacitate juvenile 
offenders where they no longer pose a threat to the 
community.131  Proportionality limitations arise, not to 
restrict society’s interest in punishment, but to acknowledge 
that punishment is not the only purpose that states must 
pursue, especially for juveniles. The Supreme Court has held 
that some sentences violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment” because the 
penalties were disproportionate to the offenses.132  In Weems, 
the Court struck down a criminal sentence because it was 
                                                 
129 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958). 
130 Kenneth Gewerth and Clifford K. Dorne, Imposing the Death 
Penalty on Juvenile Murderers: A Constitutional Assessment, 75 
JUDICATURE 6, 7-8 (1991). See also The Providence Journal, Young 
murder defendant pleads guilty, July 26, 2005, at A1 (comments of Rhode 
Island Superior Court Judge William A. Dimitri when sentencing Marvin 
Rubio, who was 15-years-old at the time of the offense: “Everyone 
involved in this case were children…I feel like a Third World judge 
imposing these [life] sentences on kids this age. But the law is the law” 
Id.).  
131 See United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Posner, J., concurring) (“A civilized society locks up [criminals] until 
age makes them harmless but it does not keep them in prison until they 
die.”Id.). 
132 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910) (recognizing 
the proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment). 
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“cruel in excess of imprisonment.”133 Similarly, in Solem v. 
Helm, the Court held that a lengthy prison term violated the 
Eighth Amendment.134  In Solem, an adult defendant was 
sentenced to LWOP under a South Dakota recidivist 
statute.135  The Court reasoned that “[i]t would be anomalous 
indeed” if fines and the death penalty were subject to 
proportionally analysis under the Eighth Amendment and 
“punishment of imprisonment” was not.136 Incapacitation is a 
means of preventing future crime. Certainly, LWOP would 
achieve this purpose (as would the juvenile death penalty), 
but, according to Roper, not even psychiatrists or 
psychologists can predict whether a juvenile is beyond 
rehabilitation.137  Therefore, the Eighth Amendment forbids 
juvenile LWOP sentence because such extreme sentences are 
“grossly disproportionate” to the crimes.138  Adults convicted 
of murders and rape are rarely sentenced so harshly—in 
United States v. Fountain, two defendants convicted of first-
degree murder, each having previously murdered three 
people, were sentenced to life with possibility of parole after 
ten years.
139  Accordingly, juveniles should be given a chance 
at rehabilitation and have a possibility of parole when 
                                                 
133 Id. at 377. (“it is a precept of justice that punishment for the crime 
should be graduated and proportioned to offense.” Id. at 367.). See also 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 985 (1991) (Scalia, J. 
concurring)) (Although Justice Scalia has argued that the Eighth 
Amendment contains no “guarantee against disproportionate sentences” 
because proportionality “is inherently a concept tied to the penological 
goal of retribution.” He further argued that “the plurality is not applying 
law but evaluating policy” which is improper for the Court. Id.  at 32.). 
134 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
135 Id. at 279. 
136 Id. at 289 (The Court concedes that reversal of prison sentences on 
proportionality grounds will be “exceedingly rare.” Id. at 289-90. (citing 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980))). 
137 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
138 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (citation 
omitted). 
139 United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 
1987)(Posner, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 
790, 799-800 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). 
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rehabilitated and reasonably punished.  Juvenile LWOP 
permanently banishes juveniles from society even when 
rehabilitated. 
 
 V.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Lawmakers and judges must authorize a term of years or 
sentences with eligibility of parole for juvenile offenders to 
eliminate this injustice. This approach has been adopted in 
New York, Oregon, Kentucky, and more recently in 
Colorado.140 For instance, under Colorado law, a juvenile 
who would otherwise receive LWOP would be eligible for 
parole after 40 years.141 State and federal judges have 
authority and are compelled under the U.S. Constitution 142 to 
refuse to sentence juveniles to LWOP sentences because it is 
patently unfair.  Furthermore, juveniles sentenced to life in 
prison without parole violates international treaty and 
customary law.  In People v. Miller, the Illinois Supreme 
Court affirmed a trial court judge’s refusal to impose the 
mandatory LWOP sentence on a 15-year-old convicted of 
two counts of first-degree murder, ruling that the punishment 
was disproportionate to the crime and violates the 
Constitution and international law.143  
                                                 
140 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05(2)(c) (McKinney 1993) (Under 
New York law, the court must impose a statutorily mandated minimum 
period of imprisonment when sentencing a juvenile); See State v. Davilla, 
972 P.2d 902, 904 (Or. 1998) (holding that “from the plain language of 
the statutes…juveniles [may] not be sentenced to imprisonment for the 
duration of their lives without having the possibility of release. A 
departure sentence of 116 years is in practical effect imprisonment for life 
without the possibility of release or parole.” Id.); Workmen v. 
Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968) (holding that life 
imprisonment without benefit of parole when applied to juveniles “shocks 
the general conscience of society today and is intolerable to fundamental 
fairness.” Id.); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-1.3-401 (as amended in May 2006).  
141 See COLO. REV. STAT. §18-1.3-401 (IV)(4)(a) (2006). 
142 U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2. (state judges are compelled because the 
U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land). 
143 State v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 330 (Ill. 2002) (affirming the trial 
judge’s sentence of 50 years in prison for a juvenile rather than the LWOP 
mandated by Illinois statute.). 
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State and federal judges should adopt the same line of 
reasoning. In fact, the Supreme Court has interpreted Article 
VI of the Constitution to require that “state law must yield 
when it is inconsistent with or impairs the policy or 
provisions of a treaty or of an international compact or 
agreement.”144 Accordingly, state judges should exercise 
their discretion to not impose LWOP sentences on 
juveniles.145 
Similar to the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper, the 
government must provide retroactive relief to juveniles 
currently sentenced to LWOP. These individuals (who may 
no longer be juveniles) should be re-sentenced to a term of 
years taking into account the individual’s potential for 
rehabilitation, risk of recidivism, danger to the public, age, 
and maturity at the time of offense. These individuals should 
be provided treatment, education, and rehabilitation 
programs. Further, those sentenced as a juvenile, who have 
served 20 years or more should be immediately eligible for 
parole.  
State courts should not shy away from looking at 
international standards in evaluating state laws when 
fashioning sentences. International law has guided several 
court decisions. The Oregon Supreme Court used 
international law and practice in holding unconstitutional 
intimate searches performed on inmates by guards of the 
opposite sex.146  Similarly, the California Supreme Court 
looked to international standards in determining the 
constitutionality of state civil and criminal commitment 
procedures.147  
                                                 
144 U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942) (emphasis added); See 
also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (holding that where state 
probate law conflicts with a treaty, the state law must bow to the superior 
federal policy of the treaty). 
145 Further, judges may find that juvenile LWOP violates the Eighth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because the punishment, as applied 
to a juvenile, would be cruel and unusual in light of the global 
concurrence on the matter. 
146 See Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 131 (Or. 1981). 
147 See Estate of Hofferber v. Hofferber, 616 P.2d 836 (Cal. 1980). 
See also Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436  (Cal. 1980) (court also used 
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Governors also have a role in correcting this injustice. 
Governors should urge state lawmakers to abolish LWOP 
sentences for juvenile offenders. For instance, New York law 
provides that a child under the age of 15 who commits 
murder cannot be sentenced to death or life imprisonment 
without parole.148  Further, governors should commute the 
LWOP sentences to a term of years (in light of the criteria 
described above) or grant clemency to those who have served 
15 or more years in prison who no longer pose a threat to the 
public and have been rehabilitated.149 For those juveniles 
currently serving LWOP sentences, if the parole board is 
unconvinced of their rehabilitation or takes the position that 
the individual still poses a threat to society, they may not be 
released. The position of this note is not to release juveniles 
convicted of heinous crimes; rather, that there must be a 
possibility of release. 
More important, legislators and executive officials should 
provide courts with greater resources to deal effectively with 
juvenile offenders. This will revitalize the courts in the 
context of contemporary society and give them the capacity 
to achieve the purpose for which they were originally created. 
This “get-tough” approach on juvenile criminality is 
undeserving as the perception of extremely violent youths is 
based largely on the acts of a small number of juveniles with 
ready access to guns.150  The judge must keep the best interest 
of the child and remember that each child is important as an 
                                                                                                     
international standards to construe the scope of constitutional protection 
of privacy in the home). 
148 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (1)(b) (1998 & Supp. 2004) (removing 
juveniles from jurisdiction for first degree murder by stating that liability 
for murder in the first degree requires that the defendant be “more than 
eighteen years old” at the time of the commission of the crime.). 
149 Inmates whom have served fifteen years or more should be 
immediately eligible for parole. The parole board, as always, will 
determine whether the inmate has been rehabilitated, no longer poses a 
threat to self or the general public, etc. 
150 See Thomas F. Geraghty, Symposium on the Future of the Juvenile 
Court: Justice for Children: How Do we Get There?, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 190, 190 n.2 (citing Donna Lyons, Juvenile Crime and 
Justice: State Enactments, 1995, 20 ST. LEGIS. REP. 17 (1995) (50-state 
survey), 191, 199 (discussing the Illinois statutory change) (1997)). 
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individual, to help guide the sentencing policy. A change in 
the sentencing scheme as proposed here will impose 
substantial punishment, provide incentives for rehabilitation, 
and, where rehabilitation works, eliminate the economic and 
social costs of permanent incarceration. 
 
VI.       CONCLUSION 
 
In the aftermath of Roper v. Simmons, a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole for juveniles violates the United 
States Constitution. Even if the LWOP could be applied to a 
juvenile without violating the Eighth Amendment, it violates 
international law. Although the Supreme Court has not 
addressed the constitutionality of juvenile LWOP directly, 
when it does, it will consider the “climate of international 
opinion concerning the acceptability of [such] punishment” 
and it will find that juvenile LWOP sentences violate 
international law.151  Challenges to juvenile LWOP sentences 
have not been considered from the point of view of juvenile 
culpability and competency.152 However, state and federal 
judges have the power to correct this grave injustice before 
the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court rule on the question. 
                                                 
151 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958)).  See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815 (1988); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997-98 (1999) (Justice 
Breyer noting the Court’s “[w]illingness to consider foreign judicial news 
in comparable cases is not surprising to a Nation that from its birth has 
given a ‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind.’” Id.) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting, from denial of certiorari). 
152 Foster v. Withrow, 159 F. Supp.2d 629, 636 (E.D. Mich. 2001) 
(Petitioner, convicted of a murder committed at age sixteen was sentenced 
to LWOP, challenges sentence without raising claims of juvenile 
culpability and competency. Court held sentence does not violate due 
process or Eighth Amendment); Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 749 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (Petitioner, an illiterate and mildly retarded 16-year-old, 
sentenced to LWOP challenges sentence by raising issues of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, competence to stand trial and competence to waive 
Miranda warnings, without raising claims of juvenile culpability); Harris 
v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 582-83 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming sentence of 15-
year-old sentenced to LWOP, who based appeal on violation of Eighth 
Amendment and due process.). 
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Judges need not wait for the legislature to act because judges 
are bound by international law and are authorized to enforce 
international law and human rights treaty.153  The Miller, 
Atkins, and Roper decisions all support a finding that juvenile 
LWOP sentences violate the Constitution. Justice Harry 
Blackmun once urged that “it... is appropriate to remind 
ourselves that the United States is part of the global 
community... and that courts should construe our statutes, our 
treaties, and our Constitution, where possible, consistently 
with ‘the customs and usages of civilized nations.”’154 
Accordingly, it would be a violation of international and 
constitutional law to continue sentencing juveniles to die in 
prison when judges can correct the mistake. 
Treating children like adults when it comes to sentencing 
inaccurately assumes that juveniles, whom cannot be trusted 
with voting or smoking because they “lack the judgment to 
make an intelligent decision,” possess the skills to understand 
the consequences of a lengthy prison sentence before he or 
she acts. 155  Such reasoning and sentencing is unsound, 
unconscionable, and does not correspond to the notions of 
justice, especially where it violates clear international 
standards that explicitly forbid such sentences.156  Domestic 
standards also become meaningless when courts act as a 
vehicle of vengeance. The main goal of the adult criminal 
justice system is to punish criminal offenders, whereas the 
juvenile justice system—focuses on rehabilitation—at least, 
                                                 
153 See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). See also 
Honju Koh, supra note 84, at 1824 (noting that customary international 
law is federal common law and preempts inconsistent state practices).  
154 Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 
104 YALE L.J. 39, 49 (1994) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 
700 (1900)). 
155 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587 (2001) 
(concluding that children lack the judgment to make an intelligent 
decision about whether to smoke.). See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 
602-03 (1979) (explaining that “parents possess what a child lacks in 
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s 
difficult decisions. . . Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not 
able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their 
need for medical care or treatment.” Id.). 
156 Article 40(1), supra note 63. 
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in theory. When LWOP sentences are handed down to 
juveniles, the courts have failed to recognize the possibility of 
rehabilitation.   
Recognizing the lesser culpability and competency of 
children does not require society to be soft on crime.  Rather, 
it requires society to eliminate one of the harshest 
punishments that can be imposed on adults and instead to 
focus on the causes of crime while taking a sensible and 
civilized approach to sentencing.  Society has recognized the 
distinction between juveniles and adults in almost every 
aspect of society—the same logic should be extended to 
penal sanctions. Providing juvenile offenders some chance of 
integration into society will give them hope for actual 
rehabilitation to atone for their crimes. 
Life without parole sentences send a clear message to the 
world—that juvenile offenders in the United States are 
permanently banished from society. Such a sentence 
discourages juveniles from attempting to reform themselves 
during incarceration.  These sentences promote the antithesis 
of rehabilitation. 
Under the current legal landscape, the imposition of life 
without parole sentences for juveniles is unconstitutional. 
They are not only repugnant to the notions of rehabilitation, 
but have no deterrent effect, are disproportionate, and are 
beyond the time necessary to incapacitate the offender. 
Sentencing minors to die in prison is cruel and has become 
unusual, in light of the Court’s decision in Roper and the 
overwhelming global condemnation of such sentence. It is 
also worth repeating that only twelve juveniles in 192 
countries are currently serving such a sentence in comparison 
to the more than 2,200 juveniles serving LWOP sentences in 
the United States.157  Further, in states that prohibit the death 
penalty, LWOP is the harshest possible sentence for any adult 
or juvenile. To sentence a juvenile like an adult is to adopt 
the view that the offender’s culpability is completely 
irrelevant. 
                                                 
157 See HRW Report, supra note 4, at 123-24.  
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Punishing a youth offender with the longest prison 
sentence possible, denying hope of reintegration into society, 
and offering no motivation for rehabilitation is repugnant to 
the notions of justice, rehabilitation, and goals of the juvenile 
justice system. In Roper, the Court concluded that juveniles 
are more amenable to rehabilitation than adults and as a result 
should be treated differently at sentencing.158  It follows that 
denying the possibility of parole and dictating that a child die 
in prison is particularly cruel and unusual.  “A civilized 
society locks up [criminals] until age makes them harmless 
but it does not keep them in prison until they die.”159   
It is time for the United States to develop a justice system 
that is consistent with modern and global standards of justice.  
Today, the treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice 
system is, at best, a noble failure and at worst, a great 
catastrophe.  It is obvious that a change is urgent. Now is the 
time for the United States to leave the lonely island of 
juvenile injustice amidst a vast ocean of global concurrence. 
This shameful sentencing practice diminishes us as a society 
and it, not the children, must be sentenced to death. 
                                                 
158 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (stating, “From a 
moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor 
with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that minor’s 
character deficiencies will be reformed.” Id.). 
159 United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Posner, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
